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I 7870 
Case No. 7870 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT IJAKE CITY, a municip·al cor-
poration, 
Plaintiff and Respondent7 
-vs .. -
PAUL McFARLAND and· MRS. 
PAUL McFARLAND, 
Defendants and Ap·p·ellants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIF:F. AND RESPONDENT 
E .. R. CHRISTENSEN, 
City Attorney 
HOMER HOLMGREN, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Assistant City Attorneys 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT L.A.I~E CITY, a 1nunicipal ror-
poration, 
Plaintiff an-d Respondent, 
-vs.-
P _A_l~L ~IcF ... -\.RL.A_:ND and MRS. 
PAliL ~IcFARLAND, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Civil No. 7870 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF· FACTS 
In our opinion the Statement of Facts contained in 
Appellants' Brief so far fails to state the facts disclosed 
by the record that we are impelled to state the facts anew. 
The action was brought by the City to recover the 
sum of $184.31, owing to the City as of January 3, 1950 
for water furnished by the· City to the Defendants at their 
home at 4880 Highland Circle in Salt Lake County at 
Defendants' instance and request. 
The evidence shows without" any dispute· that on or 
about May 27, 1947 defendant, Mrs. Paul McFarland, 
at the direction of and being sent to do so by her husband, 
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Paul McF:arland, (R. 49) applied to E. R. Berrett, office 
manager of plaintiff's water works department, (R. 13) 
at his office, 112 City & County Building, Salt Lake City, 
(R. 15) for water service. (R. 14) At that time she signed 
the regular printed application for water service which 
the City requires to be signed by persons desiring water 
service. (R. 18) This original application is in evidence 
as Exhibit "A." By the terms thereof the applicant 
agrees to "Be responsible for and pay all bills for all 
water furnished to the premises in accordance with City 
ordinances." The application indicates that the bills were 
to be sent to 1630 South Main Street,. but on July 7, 1949, 
a change was made to send the bills to 4880 Highland Cir-
cle, (R. 19) the home of defendants (R. 47) and the place 
to which the water was to be delivered under the terms 
of the application, as shown on Exhibit "A." 
On the same date, May 27, 1947, an invoice, Exhibit 
"B," was made out by plaintiff for the cost of installing 
the service and meter at 4880 Highland Circle in the sum 
of $60.00. (R. 19, 20) This sum was paid by defendant, 
Paul McFarland, and water has been furnished continu-
ously since that time through this service connection. 
See Exhibit "B" and testimony of Mr. McFarland. (R. 
49) 
The plaintiff introduced in evidence, two sheets, 
as Exhibit "C," being a record of the monthly meter read-
ings at the water service at defendants' residence, com-
mencing with November 1, 1947, and ending June 1, 
1950. ( R. 21) The sheets are read from bottom to top. 
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i) 
The reading·s are n1ade bv the 1neter reader each n1on th 
~ ~ 
and placed on the sheets by hin1. These figures sho"r 
tl1e rueter readings each n1onth by cubic feet and the nurn-
ber of cubie feet consu1ned is arrived at by substracting 
the reading one 111onth from the reading the next month. 
The penciled figures in the right-hand column were taken 
from the original card record Exhibit "D"· (R. 24), and 
sho'v the an1ount of the charge for the water delivered. 
(R. 22, :23) Of the charges shown on Exhibit "C" defend-
ants paid the following: $4.77 June 1, 1948 bill, $8.46 
July :2, 1948 bill, and $16.4 7 August 2, 1948 bill, a total of 
$29.69. The charges made each month for the water de-
livered are shown on the original record, Exhibit "D/' 
which shows these payments and the balance owing as of 
January 3, 1950 of $184.31, the total charges to that date 
having been $214.00. (R. 26) Bills for the various month-
ly charges were sent out regularly. Exhibits "E" and 
"F" (R. 27, 28) are copies of the City's ordinances in ef-
fect covering the period of these billings and show that 
bills are to be rendered monthly as determined by the 
Superintendent of water works. 
It will be noticed that charges were not made for all 
of the readings on Exhibit "C." In other words, defend-
ants were not charged for all of the water delivered. 
They were given a free allowance of 2,000 cubic feet per 
month from October 1st to April 1st and 3600 cubic feet 
per month from April 1st to October 1st, which credit 
or allowance was explained to Mrs. McF'arland at the 
time she signed the application for water service, Exhibit 
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"A." These cubic feet, when reduced to gallons, amounted 
to 500 gallons per day from October 1st to April 1st and 
900 gallons per day from April 1st to October 1st. It 
\vas also explained to her that before a water service 
eould he granted, she 1nust own stock in the Green Ditch 
Water Company, (R. 15) and the allowance was based 
on each full acre share of stock. Any water in access of 
the 1nonthly allowance would be charged for at regular 
City rates. (R. 16) Defendants had one acre share of 
culinary water stock in the Green Ditch Water Company, 
as shown by a list of stockholders furnished the City by 
said Company. (R. 17) 
The basis and reason for this allowance is the Ex-
change Agreem_ent entered into, under date of December 
15, 1919, between the beneficial owners of the water of the 
Green Ditch and Salt Lake City, in evidence as Exhibit 
"H." By the terms of this agreement, the owners of the 
water decreed to the Green Ditch from Big Cottonwood 
Creek conveyed their rights thereto to Salt Lake City, re~ 
serving to themselves from October 1st to April 1st, 500 
gallons per day for each acre of land owned by e·ach such 
party, and 900 gallons per day per each acre from April 
1st to October 1st. These amounts of water were to be 
delivered free to the respective owners through water 
mains to be built and maintained by the City. Any water 
delivered in excess of these amounts was to be paid for at 
the regular City rates. 
In addition to the culinary water to be delivered in a 
water main system, the City agreed to furnish irrigation 
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\Yatt>r at points available to the \Yater users in £unount~ 
specified for the n1onths of April to October inclusive. 
The agreen1ent sitpulates there are 573 shares held hy the 
stockholders entitled to the culinary water and 573 acres 
of land covered by the Green Ditch. 
Defendants \Yere not parties to the agree1nent, but 
they derived their title from Franklin (Frank) D. Brin-
ton, "-ho signed the agreen1ent. The chain of defendants' 
title is shown by Exhibit "G," an abstract of title. Entry 
No. 4 sho\YS the deed to Frank D. Brinton to 11.66 acres . 
..._t\.fter entering into the agreen1ent with Salt Lake City, 
Exhibit ~~H," he conveyed by deed one acre share of 
culinary water to Ruben Newman. See entry No. 7. 
Thereafter he executed several mortgages, two in 1928 
and one in 1930, covering real property which includes 
defendants' present property, and including 131;2 acres 
irrigating and 21;2 acres culinary water rights in the 
Green Ditch Water Company. See entries 13, 15 and 17, 
exhibit "G." 
By executor's deed, entry No. 27, his prop.erty was 
conveyed to Claud Hinnen and wife, together with water 
rights appurtenant. While the Hinnens owned the prop-
erty they mortgaged it to Enos Jacklin and included 
4lf2 shares (irrigation only) of Green Ditch Water Com-
pany. See entry No. 32, exhibit "G." The deed from the 
Hinnens to William Jacklin and wife, in 1935, also con-
veyed 41f2 shares (irrigation only) Green Ditch Irriga-
tion Company. See entry No. 33. The Jacklins deeded 
to Robert L. Meier and wife conveying 3 or 31;2 shares 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
of Green Ditch Irrigation water stock and one share 
Green Ditch culinary water stock. See entry No. 40. 
This deed covers the same real property now owned by 
defendants. rrhe l\feiers conveyed to Robert B. Pace and 
wife and included :3 ~!hares of Green Ditch Irrigation 
Water Ntock and 1 share Green Ditch culinary water 
stock, entry No. 42, and the Paces conveyed the same land 
and water stock to defendants in 1945, entry No. 43. The 
foregoing entries are the only ones which cover the trans-
fer of water stock in the chain of title from Frank D. 
Brinton to defendants as shown by defendants' abstract 
of title. 
Farron Cutler, secretary of the Green Ditch Water 
Company, testified that "the records of the company 
show Paul McFarland has one 'full share' of stock, which 
has culinary and irrigation rights. He purchased that 
from R. B. Pace and Mary Pace, who obtained it from 
Robert L. Meier, who obtained it from W. N. Jacklin 
and he purchased it from Beneficial Life Insurance Conl-
pany." This stock came from the George C. Smith estate 
( R. 85) which is the same property as the Wasatch Farms 
Company property. (R. 86) The Wasatch F:a.rms Com-
pany was a signatory to the Exchange Agree.ment 
through the Beneficial Life Insurance Company. 'See 
pages 8 and 10 of exhibit "H." 
It thus appears that this one "full share" of stock 
did not come through Franklin D·. Brinton, but was pur-
chased by William N. Jacklin from another source. This 
harmonizes with the abstract entry No. 33, showing the 
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conYeynnee of the land by Claud II inn en and \\' i f'p to 
\Y.illiain X. Jacklin but cony eying no enlina ry \Vater 
stork onlY -l-1.) ~hare~ of irrig·ation \rater. Entrv No. 
' .. , - ..... _ . 
3S ~hO\YS J arklin ronYPYed one share of irrig·ation water 
o L 
stock to Farron E. Cutler and \Yife \Yhich left 3¥2 share~ 
of the san1e kind of stock \Yhich \Yas conveyed by the 
J acklins to ~Ieier, entry No. 40. 
The ~eeretary, ~Ir. Cutler, further testified ''that 
nir. :JicFarland is entitled to 3¥2 shares of irrigation 
\Yater only, the stock certificate of \vhich he claims title 
is now in the name of\\~. N. Jacklin, but has never been 
transferred on the books of the Company. That certifi-
cate has only one other transfer on it which I can find, 
and that it came from the Frank Brinton estate." (R. 86, 
87) The company recognizes to some extent that Mc-
Farland has rights under this 3¥2 shares of irrigation 
stock, even though no formal transfer to him has been 
made on the records of the company. He is assessed for 
them. (R. 89) Mr. Godfrey, the water master for the 
Green Ditch, testified he delivered irrigation water to 
nicFarland on the basis of 4¥2 shares. (R. 99) This 
would be for the 3lf2 shares irrigation stock and the one 
full share which has both culinary and irrigation rights as 
above described by Mr. Cutler and derived from the 
Beneficial Life through the Wasatch F'arms Company. 
The Board of Directors, however, has never agreed to 
make the transfer though requested to do so by Mc-
Farland. (R. 91) The Board of Directors decision was 
that "it wasn't a complete share of stock because a share 
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of stock is a share having culinary and irrigation rights, 
which have never been developed." 
It thus conclusively appears that for many years, at 
least fron1 the ti1ne the exchange agreement was entered 
into, as sho\vn by the transfer by Brinton of one share 
culinary ,,~a ter stock, carrying 500 and 900 gallons daily, 
as shown hy entry No. 7, exhibit "G,'' the Company and 
the stockholders have been treating their stock as creat-
ing either culinary or irrigation water rights or both 
such rights. It also appears that the shares were not 
considered so far appurtenant to the land that they could 
not be conveyed away to other parties. The one share 
of culinary water stock now owned by defendants did not 
co1ne to the1n with their land but came from a complete 
stranger to the chain of title to the land. It also appears 
that defendants' predecessor in interest, Brinton, con-
veyed away to Ruben Newman one share of culinary 
water without any conveyance of land therewith, entry 
No. 7, exhibit "G." The only information furnished plain-
tiff as to the stock ownership of defendants, either by 
defendants themselves or by the Company, was that de-
fendants had one share of culinary water stock. 
Further, Mr. Cutler testified that "there are stock 
certificates outstanding which show on them culinary 
only, but we did not recognize either the culinary or the 
irrigation stock as being complete shares of stock.,, This 
shows that the Company itself has been issuing stock 
certificates calling only for culinary water. 
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~-\.s 'Ye understand defendants' position, their only 
defense to this action is tl1at their right to use water is 
based upon the nun1ber of neres of land they own, and 
since the records sho"'" they o'Yn ~.SS acres of land, they 
'Yould be entitled to free culinary "Tater upon the basis 
of o'vning 2.SS shares, rather than one, and so would 
not owe the City anything. 
STATE~IENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
l\IERE OWNERSHIP OF A STATED ACREAGE OF 
LAND IS NOT PROOF OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT 
OF WATER RIGHTS OF THE OWNER OF LAND. 
POINT II. 
THE MERE FACT THAT THE EXCHANGE AGREE-
Iv.IENT PROVIDES FOR ACRE SHARES DOES NOT SHOW 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO CULINARY WATER ON 
THE BASIS OF 2.88 ACRES. 
POINT III. 
THE SHARE HOLDERS OF THE GREEN DITCH HAD 
THE RIGHT TO MAKE THE EXCHANGE AGREEMENT 
AND TO CONVEY THEIR WATER RIGHTS TO THE CITY, 
RESERVING CULINARY WATER IN CERTAIN QUANTI-
TIES. 
POINT IV. 
UNDER THE ORDINANCES AND THE EXCHANGE 
AGREEMENT, THE CITY MAY MAKE MONTHLY BILL-
INGS. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
MERE OWNERSHIP OF A STATED ACREAGE OF 
LAND IS NOT PROOF OF THE NATURE AND EXTENT 
OF WATER RIGHTS OF THE OWNER OF LAND. 
l ~ nder the provisions of ·section 100-1-10, U.C.A. 
1943, a~ a1uended 19-t;) La-\vs, page 263, water rights may 
be transferred hy deed in the same manner as real 
estate. s.ection 100-1-11 provides that a. water right 
n1ay be sold and conveyed separate from the land. In 
the case of Cortella vs. Salt Lake City, 93 Utah 236, 
72 P. 2d, 630, the court says: 
'"It would not be sufficient to allege present 
ownership of a tract of land to which water had 
been appurtenant at some time in the past in 
order to show present ownership of such water 
right. By the terms of Section 100-1-11, RS 1933, 
an appurtenant water right may be sold and con-
veyed separate from the land. * * * To state a 
cause of action on the one hand, and findings of 
fact sufficient to sustain a judgment on the other 
hand, we think it should appear that the rights 
acquired by the original ownership under the 
exchange agreement had not been sold or other-
\vise transferred separate from the land or trans-
ferred from the land here involved to some other 
land, whether within or without the said 547 acre 
tract." 
That case involved an exchange agreement between 
Salt Lake City and the owners of vvater of Parleys Creek, 
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'vhose co1nbined lands covered 54 7 acres. It was held 
that the rights of the "\Vater owners under the exchange 
agreement could be transferred or sold. The case o:E 
J.lloyle vs. Salt Lake (-yity, 50 l~tah 357, 167 P. 660, \vas 
cited as authority, that case holding that the holders 
of the exchange right could transfer the water to be 
supplied by the City under the agreement to lands five 
( 5) miles to the south and outside the acreage on which 
Parley's Creek water had been beneficially used. The 
evidence, heretofore referred to, shows that the de-
fendants' predecessors in interest to the land conveyed 
some of the 'vater rights owned by them and had con-
\eyed separately culinary water rights as well as irri-
gation water rights. Under these conditions, and the 
law above referred to, the only water rights shown to 
be owned by defendants was the one full acre which 
called for both culinary and irrigation water. There is 
no evidence whatever that defendants, when they ac-
quired the land, acquired any water rights other than 
the 3 or 3lf2 shares of irrigation water and the one share 
of culinary water. 
POINT II. 
THE MERE FACT THAT THE EXCHANGE AGREE-
MENT PROVIDES FOR ACRE SHARES DOES NOT SHOW 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO CULINARY WATER ON 
THE BASIS OF 2.88 ACRES. 
The evidence shows that defendants owned just one 
full acre share of water right. In addition they owned 
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3lj2 shares of irrigation water. The exchange agree-
lnent provided for 573 acre shares of culinary water. 
The agree1nent did not provide that these acre shares 
should forever remain attached to particular acreages 
or that a conveyanc~ of an acre of ground would forever 
include a conveyance of one share of water. There is 
nothing in the contract to prevent an owner of five 
aereH fron1 using all his culinary water right on two 
acres and selling the other three acres without culinary 
right~. ill oyle vs. Salt Lake City, and Cortella vs. Salt 
Lake City supra. This would not involve a rewriting 
of the contract or violation of the contract in any man-
ner, as counsel contend. If counsel were right then no 
land owner could hold 1nore shares than he had acres, 
and yet defendants assert, page 13 of their Brief, that 
they own five acres of stock but own only three acres 
of land. If defendants could acquire a greater number 
of shares in stock than they had acres of land, any other 
stock owner could do the same. It is apparent, therefore, 
that defendants' argument that because they had three 
acres of land, they ipso facto had three, or five, shares 
of culinary water stock is wholly fallacious. 
Furthermore, the trial court's decision does not 
amount to amending the Articles of Incorporation. The 
water to which the owners of the shares of stock were 
entitled, stated in the Articles of Incorporation as being 
1/2280 part of the water decreed to the Green Ditch for 
eaeh share, was, under the exchange agreement, con-
veyed by the share holders to Salt Lake City. This 
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conveyance covered all ""at~r rights, culinary and irri-
gation. ,.rhe shareholders 1nerely reserved to themselves, 
and successors, the right to take frorn the City's water 
1nains free of charge 500 and 900 gallons per day per 
acres. The Green Ditch Con1pany thereupon ceased· 
having any responsibility to distribute culinary water. 
It still continued to distribute the irrigation water. 
So far as the company is concerned, therefore, it merely 
permitted deli\er~- of the canyon water to the City, 
,,-hich 'vater \vas represented by the shares of stock 
outstanding. This arrangement did not constitute an 
amendment of the Articles of Incorporation. The share-
holders \vho thus became entitled to get water from 
the City under the EfXChange agreement could divide 
su~h ,,-ater into whatever classes they desired without 
in the least having the effect of amending or violating 
the Articles of Incorporation. The trial court correctly 
stated the proposition as follows: 
"Such reserve water right vvas transferable 
hy the owners thereof. The stockholders of the 
Green Ditch thus by their own accord, lawfully 
divided the water rights they had theretofore· 
owned into two classes, irrigation water rights 
still to be distributed by the trustee, Green Ditch 
Company, and the quantity of water reserved 
by the owners for culinary purposes became the 
culinary right on the 500 and 900 gallon basis 
per acre right owned or transferred by the own-
ers." 
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If what the stockholders had been doing for the 
pat-it twenty years, with the full acquiescence of the 
<·ontpany in recognizing and issuing stock in harmony 
therewith, constituted an unlawful amendment of the 
Articles of Incorporation, defendants have their recourse 
against the stockholders so doing and against the com-
pany. Certainly they cannot try out such issue in this 
a<'tion wjthout the proper parties. And where would 
they stand if such an issue were here involved~ The 
very stock they own, by the undisputed evidence, is 
divided into two classes, culinary water stock and irri-
gation water stock, one share of the one and 3lf2 shares 
of the other. Upon what basis can defendants compel 
a fusion of these two classes~ The Green Ditch Board 
of Directors refused to concede that defendants have 
4¥2 or 5 full shares of stock, each ctarrying both culinary 
and irrigation water. Certainly the City in this action 
cannot be compelled to recognize an ownership that the 
con1pany itself refuses to re.cognizH and that in fact 
does not exist. When defendants acquired 3lf2 shares 
of irrigation stock only that wa.s all they acquired how-
ever much it may be argued that the stockholders who 
sold them to defendants had no right to deliver such a 
class of stock. 
Defendants have asserted, contrary to the evidence 
and findings of the trial court, that they own two shares 
of culinary stock. In our statement of facts we have 
shown, by the testimony of the. secretary of the Green 
Ditch Company, the defendants' stock ownership. This 
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sho\YS that he O\Yns one share of enlinary stock \vhich 
also carries irrigation rights and 3% shares of irrigation 
\Yater stock. )lr. l\lr Farland testified that his abstract 
of title sho\YS the chain of his w·ater and also the title 
to. his property. '':hen asked if he had one share of 
culinary \Yater stock, he answered: .. That's the question. 
I purchased one share separately from the water I was 
entitled to \Yhen I purchased the property," and that 
share \Yas purchased from ~lr. Pace from whom he 
purchased the land. (R. 50) Later on cross-examination, 
he stated that in addition to the shares mentioned in 
the deed, he purchased one share from Mr. Pace that 
had been purchased by ~lr. Pace from an insurance 
company. (R. 57) He further testified that he got his 
certificate for either one share or for quarterly shares 
from )lr. Pace and that was when he purchased the 
land and that was the only certificate he got. (R. 59, 
60) This clearly is the same certificate testified to by 
}Ir. Cutler, the company secretary, which share he 
traced back to the Wasatch Farms Company and Bene-
ficial Life Insurance Company and is the only share of 
culinary water carried on the records of the company 
in defendants' name. He testified Pace got it from 
Meier, Meier from Jacklin and Jacklin from Beneficial 
Life Insurance Company. That share is likewise traced 
in the abstract back to Jacklin. This undoubtedly was 
the same certificate that Mrs. McFarland exhibited to 
~Ir. Berrett, the water department office manager, when 
she came in to apply for a water service. (R. 37) The 
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trial court found that defendants owned one share of 
eulinary water stock. That certainly is in harmony with 
the evidence. 
POINT III. 
THE SHARE HOLDERS OF THE GREEN DITCH HAD 
THE RIGHT TO MAKE THE EXCHANGE AGREEMENT 
AND TO CONVEY THEIR WATER RIGHTS TO THE CITY, 
RESERVING CULINARY WATER IN CERTAIN QUANTI-
TIES. 
r~rhe exchange agreement, exhibit "H", was entered 
into hy the stockholders of the Green Ditch and not by 
the Green Ditch Company itself. Under Article No.7 of 
the Articles of Incorporation, quoted at page 22 of de-
fendants' brief, each share of stock "shall represent a 
water right equal to 1/2280 part of the water decreed 
to the Green Ditch in the Morse decree." It is further 
provided that the company could not "sell any water 
or 'vater rights for or on behalf of the corporation with-
out an affirmative vote of all the issued and outstanding 
capital stock." This clearly indicates that while the com-
pany holds the bare legal title to the 'vater rights under 
the Morse decree, the beneficial ownership is in the 
stockholders as found by the trial court. In other words, 
the corporation was a mutual irrigation company. 
In Genola Town vs. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 88, 
80 P. 2d 930, Genola entered into an exchange agree-
ment with Santaquin City, under the terms of which 
Genola transferred sixty shares of stock it held in Sum-
n1it Creek Irrigation and Canal Company. Santaquin 
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\Yas to receiYe the \Yater to \Yhich these sixty ~harP~ 
\\~ere entitled, and Genola \Yas to receive 100 gallons per 
1ninute continuous flow of \vater fron1 Santaquin water 
sYstenl. There \vas son1e question as to "·hether the 
irrigation company could be compelled to deliver a con-
tinuous fio\v to Santaquin under the sixty share~ or 
\\~hether the CitY \Yould haYe to take its turn along with 
the other stockholders. The court says : 
""Stock in a 1nutual con1pany entails the right 
to demand such stockholder's aliquot share of the 
water in proportion as his stockholding bears 
to all the stock. Water rights are pooled in a 
1nutual company for convenience of operation 
and n1ore efficient distribution, and perhaps foy 
1nore convenient transfer. But the stock certifi-
cate is not like the stock certificate in a company 
operating for profit. It is really a certificate 
showing an undivided part ownership in a cer-
tain \Yater supply. It embraces the right to call 
for such undivided part according to the method 
of distribution." 
A stockholder could lease or sell the water to which 
he is entitled under. his stockholding and still retain 
ownership of the stock itself. He can enter into an 
agreement to permit the city to perpetually use the 
water he is entitled to for such consideration and under 
such conditions as he sees fit. By so doing title to the 
water delivered to the City vests, upon such delivery, in 
the City. When the water is turned into the City's Big 
Cottonwood conduit and there com1ningled with the 
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City's water, there has been a transfer of title and the 
( ~i ty can then sell back to the stockholders the water so 
a<~quired. Defendants' position that the City could not 
re<'over because it did not have title to the water sold 
to defendants is clearly erroneous. The company delivers 
the water to the stockholders and the stockholder de-
livers it to the City. This does not require any exchange 
agreement with the company. 
Contrary to counsel's assertion, the record does show 
that defendants' predecessors in interest, both of the 
land and of the full share culinary stock, were parties 
to the agreement. The land came down from Franklin 
(Frank) D. Brinton. See entry No. 8 abstract, exhibit 
"G", and page 9, exhibit "H". The one share culinary 
stock, as already shown, came from the Wasatch Farms 
Company. That company signed the exchange agree-
ment, exhibit "H", (see page 9), and again by Beneficial 
Life Insurance Company on behalf of Wasatch Farms 
Company. (See page 10) The agreement, page 8, pro--
vided: "This contract shall be binding upon the parties 
hereto, their successors and assigns." 
During the trial counsel for defendants demanded 
to know whether Salt Lake City took the position that 
exhibit "H" constituted a binding contract between the 
City and defendants. (R. 63) Counsel for the City stated 
plainly that that was the City's position. When counsel 
for the City asked defendants' counsel if defendants rec-
ognize the agreement as binding upon them, defendants' 
counsel refused to state one way or the other. (R. 65) 
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... -\.t the conclusion of the trial, defendants' counsel still 
refused to state their position, stating they did not know 
"That the effect of exhibit ~~ H" is. 
It seems too clear for argument that if defendants 
were not bound by exhibit HH" then they have no right 
to any \Yater fron1 Salt Lake City free of charge and 
they are liable for all of the \Yater delivered to them 
under the application, exhibit .. _A_H. If the Green Ditch 
delivered defendants~ water to the City without authority 
from defendants, then they have recourse against the 
company and had they received their water from the 
company it \Yould have come down in an open ditch 
and not through the City's water main system. If de-
fendants want to take the position that they were not 
parties to and have no privity with the exchange agree-
Inent, let them so state. Then the City can dec~de whether 
to continue delivery of water under defendants' existing 
application for water service at county rates and not 
City rates, or cease furnishing water altogether. Until 
defendants do that, they must know they are receiving a 
credit for free \Vater under the agreement, exhibit "H", 
and are bound to pay for the water used in excess of 
the free water. 
POINT IV. 
UNDER THE ORDINANCES AND THE EXCHANGE 
AGREEMENT, THE CITY MAY MAKE MONTHLY BILL-
INGS. 
The exchange agreement, exhibit "H", provides, page 
No. 6, as follows : 
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"Any water owner, his successors or assigns, 
shall have the right to use the water of Salt 
Lake City through said pipe line in excess of the 
<tuantity of water so owned and reserved by him 
upon the payment by him to Salt Lake City of 
the regular f-;alt Lake City water rate charges 
at the tilne of use, subject, however, to the same 
rules and regulations as apply to the residents 
of Salt Lake City at the time of use." 
From the very terms of the provision it agrees that 
the exce~s water is Salt Lake City's water and is to be 
delivered under the same rules and regulations as apply 
to residents of Salt Lake City. So far as the time of 
billing for water delivered is concerned the rules and 
regulations of ·salt Lake City are contained in the ordi-
nances which are in evidence as exhibits "E" and "F", 
both of which provide as follows: 
"Bills for water used through meters shall 
be rendered monthly, or quarterly; the superin-
tendent of water works to determine from time 
to time when monthly or quarterly meter readings 
shall be made and bills rendered." 
Defendants have been billed on a monthly basis 
from the beginning. They paid the first three monthly 
bills. The contract calls for a certain gallonage per day, 
but there is no requirement that daily readings be made. 
The contract does contain the provision above quoted 
and the ordinances above referred to constitute such 
rules and regulations. Any uncertainty in the matter 
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has been settled by the parties under the past thirty 
years, during which time Inonthly bills have been ren-
dered. l~nder the terms of exhibit H.A." defendants agreed 
to ~~pay all bills for \Yater supplied to premises in accord-
ance 'vith City ordinances." 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants signed a written application for 
\Vater serYice for "Yater to be delivered through the City's 
"Tater main system. They agreed to pay for that water 
in accordance with the City ordinances. Water was in 
fact delivered to them tmder this application during 
the time covered by the complaint. Instead of charging 
for all \Vater so delivered, the City gave defendants a 
credit allowance under the exchange agreement. If de-
fendants are not entitled to such credit allowance, they 
are not being required to pay as much as they really 
owe. If they are entitled to the credit allo\vance the 
judgment, without dispute, is for the correct amount. 
\v ... e respectfully submit that the trial court was correct 
in its judgment and that the same should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN, 
City Attorney 
HOMER HOLMGREN, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Assistant City Attorneys 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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